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Introduction
Debating different policy choices and weighing their pros and cons has been a classic activity of practitioners and academics alike. On all thinkable subjects there are people engaged in designing and recommending what they see as ideal policies. At times these go hand in hand with like-minded policy choices in other fields and galvanize into overarching paradigms for political, economic or social change.
One particularly influential example of such policy design is the paradigm of economic liberalization and deregulation that became dominant in Latin America in the 1980s and all through the 1990s. In what came to be known as the 'Washington Consensus' (Williamson 1990 ), a set of policy measures towards market-oriented reforms in Latin America was spelt out as recommendations shared by the key Washington-based international actors, namely 6
Hoffmann: The 'Politics of Policies' in Costa Rican Telecommunications Liberalization the IMF, World Bank, and the U.S. government. Prominently among this 'standard reform package' figured the call for privatization of state enterprises and the abolition of regulations that were thought to impede market entry or restrict economic competition.
While the liberalization paradigm swept the continent and largely dismantled the economic structures of the more state interventionist development model that preceded it, by now some disillusion has set in. Economic results are not all that was hoped for, and social polarization has increased, rather than decreased. While according to the mainstream of Washington Consensus proponents liberalizing reforms should go hand in hand with good governance and better economic performance and should hence improve electoral performance, current trends signal rather the opposite. Opinion polls as well as social manifestations show growing discontent with the established political elites in numerous countries, and critics of the liberalization agenda are finding a growing following. In Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador this led to electoral victories of candidates promising profound social change and a reversal of liberalizing policies. The pendulum in the public perception and political viability of liberalization, 'this latest project of modernity' (Whitehead 2006: 194) the continent's elites embraced, seems to be swinging back.
Also within the Washington-based international financial institutions (IFIs) some revision has begun. Among these, the 2006 report of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) stands out as it focuses -so its title -on 'The Politics of Policies' (IDB 2005) . The report's key argument is that a policy design of one-size-fits-all prescriptions is an excessively technocratic approach; instead the authors' premise is that 'the processes of discussing, approving, and implementing policies may be at least as important as the specific content of the policies themselves' (ibid: 3).
The present paper will undertake a case study of a core element of the reform agenda, the liberalization of state-run telecommunications, to analyze these 'politics of policies' and their implications. However, while the IDB report essentially looks at this process from the policy-makers' perspectives, we do so from a broader analytical angle. Not only can there be an overly technocratic approach to policy formulation but also to the analysis of the politics of reform, if it understands these as a mere question of political engineering. In contrast, this study will re-link the process dynamics of policy reform to its content, in which the liberalization of the public telecommunications monopoly needs to be seen as part of a broader economic paradigm shift.
The particular case under scrutiny merits a word of explanation. For half a century, the political and ideological importance of the 'Costa Rican model' has far outweighed the limited economic significance of this small Central American country with a population of only four million. However, in many ways the country can serve as a paradigmatic case. With its sta- Following this introduction, the paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 develops an analytical framework around the concept of telecommunications regime, which situates the case study in a broader comparative perspective. It sketches the three ideal types most relevant to this study, and review the emergence of the liberalized telecommunications regime in Latin America in the 1990s. We will then move to the Costa Rican case study. Section 3 outlines the cornerstones of the Costa Rican development model and shows how these translated into a telecommunications regime that was far more inclusive than the continent's typical mould. Section 4 then brings this analysis to bear in the empirical study of the liberalization drive which culminated in the approval of a telecommunications reform law in 2000, only to be followed by its retraction after large-scale social protests. If this failure of policy implementation highlights the gap between intra-elite arrangements and public support, section 5 will explore the reform initiative's feed-back effects on the political actors themselves, as it became a catalyst for the disintegration of the country's long-established two-party system.
This political fallout becomes all the more relevant as the issue of telecom liberalization has resurfaced on the national political agenda as part of the CAFTA free trade agreement, which the current government of Óscar Arias is committed to push forward. The paper concludes by stressing that the failure of reform was not only due to tactical errors in steering the project through 'the messy world of politics ' (IDB 2005: 4) but that indeed policy content mattered, and that only the interaction of both explains the outcome.
The Transformation of the Telecommunications Regime in Latin America
The analytical framework of this paper centers aroung a concept of telecommunications regime that binds together the specific configuration of economic, social and political actors and regulatory frameworks -including structures of ownership and market, pricing schemes and patterns of diffusion and consumption in any given country or region. From this we can draw clearly distinguishable patterns, which allows to situate the analysis of any particular case in a broader comparative perspective. was the state's commitment to achieve universal service; as a consequence, investment focused on the continuous expansion of the network with the goal of providing residential telephone main lines for every household. The pricing scheme generally was based on crosssubsidies from long-distance to local calls, from business to residential users, and from urban to rural areas.
For Third World countries embarking on industrialization strategies in the 1950s, as particularly the Latin American countries did, modernization theory postulated the OECD countries as their 'role model' for development. However, just as much as the overall modernization policies led to only deformed copies of the First World models, particularly failing to provide an economically sustainable scheme of inclusive social integration, the regulatory framework of the social welfare state, and stable political democracy, so did the telecommunications regime result in a 'halved' version. It copied parts of the First World model -public monopolies, cross-subsidization schemes -, but failed on others, namely to extend the telephone network to include the citizenry at large or to bridge the gap between urban and rural areas.
In Africa and Asia, most governments nationalized telecommunications in the wake of independence. In the Latin American countries, independent since the early 19 th century, it was in the course of the 'developmentalist' projects of the post-WWII period, that governments turned foreign-owned telecommunications companies into state-run monopolies. However, initial steps were more timid than in other sectors. The continent-wide 'wave' of telecom liberalization did not fully hit Latin America until the beginning of the 1990s. The driving force for divestiture of the state-owned monopolies was less a policy choice weighing the pros and cons of each model, but rather the fact that 'a decade of economic crises during the 1980s left many Latin governments strapped for cash and unable to resist the demands of financial institutions', as the ITU, which had a key role in the international promotion of the liberalization paradigm, puts it (ibid: 2). iii As a result, governments rather than national business became the key force pushing for telecommunication privatization. iv It thus followed the traditional Latin American pattern of reform 'from above and without' (Whitehead 2006: 165 have generally risen, excluding a great part of the population from the market.
While in hindsight the 'glitter of liberalization' has faded, the wave of telecommunications reform in Latin America in the 1990s had found, on the whole, only limited opposition. In the 'politics of policies' of opening up the sector, it had been of key importance that the proponents of liberalization could insistently point to the poor performance of the public monopoly carrier in the typical state-centered telecommunications regime in the Third World. If we now turn to the Costa Rican case, we will see that here a more inclusive development model went hand in hand with a more inclusive telecommunications regime; and that where the public carrier lived much more up to its social and developmental function, also the 'politics of policies' of its liberalization took a strikingly different course. Rica's social cohesion, however, were a series of structural reforms to support small and medium farmers, including a gradual agrarian reform and the establishment of public institutions for technical support and price regulation. These policies ensured the persistence of a relatively broad rural middle class that has been a key factor for the of Costa Rican society (Seligson 1984 ).
Socially Inclusive Telecommunications Regime in the Third
On the political-institutional side, the most spectacular measure was the abolition of the While being moderately more conservative, it shared the basic consensus on the country's overall socio-economic model.
A centerpiece amongst the model's 'founding institutions' was the Costa Rican Electricity
Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE), created in 1949. The ICE not only was the state monopoly company for energy generation and electricity supply, but also for the nation's telecommunications system -a nearly unique combination internationally. It provided the energy resources for the state-led development and industrialization plans that started in the 1950s; and it fulfilled a central social function by investing great sums in a continuous push for a geographically and socially inclusive system of electricity provision. As electricity was a key concern for all sectors of society, the ICE became probably the most emblematic institution of the Costa Rican development model.
Although telecommunications for a long time appeared as the smaller sister of ICE's electricity activities, here, too, the institution made great strides in the nationwide extension of the network, following the same pattern of geographical and social inclusion as the power grid (ICE 1997b) . The ICE subsidized rates for telephone access and domestic calls, and engaged in outreach programs for rural areas, including the installation of public call offices on a concessionary basis in small towns and villages, forerunners of today's internet cafés. In contrast to the prevailing approach in most of the Third World, the Costa Rican model saw telecommunications not as a luxury item for the urban elites, but as a core function of national integration and development. As a result, Costa Rica enjoys one of the densest and socially most balanced telephone networks of all developing countries (ITU 2006) . The country's telecommunications regime thus greatly departs from the typical Third World mould.
In line with its exceptional overall development model, the diffusion and access patterns of telecommunications instead resemble those of the inclusive state-centered telecommunications regime of the First World, though implemented in the conditions of a poor country.
As a consequence, unlike other Third World countries, where the chronic deficiencies of the telephone system provided a strong argument for the dismantling of the state monopoly, in
Costa Rica even outspoken advocates of liberalization like Tacsan (2001) 
Liberalizing Telecommunications: The Politics of Reform Failure
The drive for economic liberalization policies in Costa Rica began, as elsewhere, in the wake of the foreign debt crisis. vii It was a PLN government that signed the first stabilization agreement with the IMF in 1982, which marked the beginning of a long process of structural adjustment programs. In line with the 'standard recipes' of the Washington-based IFIs, these encompassed the reduction of state expenditures to lower the budget deficit, the reduction of subsidies, the adoption of a strategy of export-led growth, and the privatization of stateowned enterprises. (Fürst 1990: 190) . In Costa Rica U.S. policy was keen to avoid social destabilization due to excessive reform pressure, resulting in the anomaly of an adjustment program accompanied by an actual increase in real social expenditures (MesaLago 2000: 496) .
For the political system it was crucially important that it were PLN governments, the administrations of Luis Alberto Monge (1982 Monge ( -1986 and Óscar Arias (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) , which steered this shift away from Costa Rica's traditional development model and set the course for a gradual, socially cushioned, yet continuous adoption of liberalization policies (Wilson 1994) .
As the study of Seligson (2002) . Although it did not include the ICE in any privatization scheme, it accelerated the drain of financial resources from the company to cover the growing public deficit.
As a consequence, the company began to lose the capacity for the large-scale investments needed for the digitization and modernization of its infrastructure.
It was the following government of Óscar Arias (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) Regarding telecommunications, the Figueres government turned to a project that, rather than pursuing privatization via the sale of the ICE, sought to leave the company in place but break up its monopoly by inviting private competition (Monge 2000: 289f) . The project encompassed three bills that were jointly introduced in the National Assembly in September 1996: First, a new 'organic law' for the ICE that included the separation of the telecommunications and electricity sectors, which would operate as independent companies under the ICE, recast as a rather loose umbrella; second, a new law for the energy sector; and third, a new law for telecommunications. The telecommunications market was to be opened to private competition, with a gradualist schedule stretching over five years. However, these bills were introduced in the second half of Figueres' term, when the upcoming elections dominated the calculations of parliamentarians of both parties. As it was widely felt that the ICE liberalization would be unpopular, both parties opted to avoid conflict and to postpone the initiative for the time being (Monge 2000: 291) .
After the 1998 elections, the newly elected President of Miguel Angel Rodríguez (PUSC) inherited the pending liberalization bills. He did present the electricity bill directly to the Na- When telecommunications reform initially hit Latin America, in a 'contagion effect' it rapidly spread from country to country. In his discussion of this type of 'wave theories' in the process of privatization Whitehead points out, that one way for this effect to reach its limit is when disillusion with the results of previous experiences sets in (Whitehead 2006: 187) .
Costa Rica is a perfect example for this. As a result of the 'politics of policies' described above, telecom liberalization had been postponed for so long, that the 'contagion effect' lost its power for the belated follower of the 'wave'. Rather to the contrary. Given the the network's broad diffusion of and ICE's low tariffs for subscription and domestic calls, proponents of liberalization could not promise much improvement on these anyway; but this now combined with the hindsight on the liberalization experiences in other Latin American countries which had led, as noted earlier, to often substantial rate increases for these services. The pro-liberalization campaign sought refuge by focusing criticism of the state monopoly on its shortcomings regarding mobile phones and the new digital information technologies. But for the majority of the population these were secondary issues; its much greater concern was the real accessibility of basic telephone service. And widespread sense of elite alienation and corruption crucially undermined the trust that the promised universal service fund would fulfil its function effectively, whereas the ICE's past record was seen as having proved by deeds its social commitment.
In Unions from that of the teachers to that of the oil workers staged solidarity strikes and called for members to participate in the anti-Combo-demonstrations.
These mobilizations were soon joined by the university students. This needs explanation as these mainly came from upper or middle sectors of society, and for them the 'heroic' days of the ICE's role in national development could have been distant history. In addition, since the students have disproportionately high interest in Internet use, they seemed a prime target group for the argument that the state monopoly blocked the dynamic development of the new information technologies. However, the majority of the students did not perceive the Combo law as a means to improve these services but instead as part and parcel of a broader agenda of liberalization which they opposed. This combined with a wide-spread disenchantment with the political establishment, so that the Combo del ICE law became the case to articulate dissatisfaction that went far beyond the telecommunications issues in a narrow sense that it involved. Following the students' demonstrations and teacher strikes, secondary students also joined the street protests. Practically all the ecological associations in the country joined against the Combo del ICE, particularly galvanized by article 119 of the law that facilitated the building of new hydroelectric plants in nature reserves by private companies.
Another unexpected, but highly important, sector participating in the protests against the In fact, while it was important for the protest coalition that it could unite heterogeneous social forces under a common goal, it was even more vital for its success that it could count on One rather unexpected source of increasing pressure were business interests. The road blockades not only affected agricultural products, which rotted due to lack of transport, but also companies such as Intel, whose Costa Rica-based microprocessor plant suffered the disruption of its electricity supply and the blocked access to the airport. While the private sector largely supported the liberalization law in principle, their more immediate concern was a return to normal business conditions. And if the government could not restore order by force, business spokesmen urged to do so by backing down xv .
Pressure also came from the President's party itself. When the protests did not, as expected, subside after the passing of the law, fears grew that the conflict might jeopardize the party's long-term political perspectives. Delegates and party members calculated that the longer the government kept to its unpopular project, the deeper the rift between the party and the electorate would be.
The third element pressuring the government into retreat came from the judiciary system.
About ten days after the law's passing, the word began to spread that the country's highest constitutional court, the Sala Cuarta, would suspend the law on the grounds of procedural mistakes. At this point, even for the government's hardliners it no longer made sense to stand by the bill. The question could not be answered anymore, why the government should keep on fighting at a truly high political price when two weeks later the Sala Cuarta would overrule the law anyway. Indeed the constitutional court revoked the law package on April18, less than a month after it was passed (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia 2000).
'Defending the ICE!' as the main slogan of the anti-Combo coalition went, was about more than just a specific institution; it almost took on the form of a plebescite 'in defense of the welfare state' (Bull 2005) . The reform proposal was, as analyzed above, embedded in an Hoffmann: The 'Politics of Policies' in Costa Rican Telecommunications Liberalization 19 overarching paradigmatic shift towards a different development model, and the protests and reactions it triggered indeed took it for nothing less.
Lessons Learned? The Political Feed-back Effects of the Liberalization Bill
The IDB report on the 'Politics of Policies' cited in the introduction puts a special emphasis on the argument, that 'policy reforms often have feedback effects on the policymaking game' and that these should be given special consideration when opting for policy choices (IDB 2005: 8) . There hardly could be a clearer case for this than thetelecom liberalization initiatives in Costa Rica, as the struggle over the Combo bill became a catalyst for the collapse of the traditional two-party system.
An opinion poll a few months after the ICE conflict showed a strong continuation of the trends diagnosed by Seligson (2002) The PUSC managed to escape the electorate's punishing vote essentially because its party leadership suffered defeat already well before Election Day. The candidate favored by the PUSC leaders lost the party's primaries to a complete outsider, the popular TV commentator Abel Pacheco. It was precisely Pacheco's distance from the party apparatus that gave him credibility and that became crucial for his impressive ability to capitalize on the discontent with the government while maintaining most of the PUSC's traditional vote, thus winning the Presidency. In Congress, the end of bi-partidism b ecame evident, as parties not aligned with the PLN or the PUSC were holding 37 per cent of the seats.
As to telecommunications, after the political disaster of the Combo law, the majority parties 
Conclusions
It is a legitimate subject of study to discuss the pros and cons of specific policy designs.
However, as the IDB's 2006 report rightly points out, such a comparative policy exercise will not suffice for explaining the policy outcomes and their real-world effects, if it does not consider adequately the dynamics of the policy-making process. If the report argues that 'the political process and the policymaking are inseparable' (IDB 2005: 4) and that 'to ignore the link between them when pursuing policy change may lead to failed reforms and dashed expectations' (ibid), the Costa Rican case is second to none in illustrating the validity of this argument.
At the same time, however, our analysis also shows the shortcomings of an overly technocratic understanding of the 'politics of policies'. The failure of reform was not only due to policy-makers' tactical errors in steering the project through 'the messy world of politics'
(ibid). While we indeed identified a number of specific decisions that negatively affected the viability of the liberalization initiative, only a more holistic view can put these in proportion.
This must take into account the specific historic trajectory of the country, as the support for policy change is likely to be the greater the more dissatisfied the citizenry is with the preceding state of things; and it must avoid an artificial separation of 'politics' and 'policies', as it is the content of policy choices that shapes the actors' responses to it.
In these regards the conceptual framework of the telecommunications regime and the different ideal types we established proved fruitful as they situate the specific reform project in the overarching economic and social transformation under way. Costa Rica's preliberalization telecommunications regime was one of the most socially inclusive to be found anywhere in the Third World. As a consequence, to most of the population the expected downsides of opening up the state monopoly outweighed its promises. Hence, it was indeed the content of policy, that was at the root of the protests against it. Moreover, widening the focus on the social and economic model in which the reform was embedded provides the key to understanding why the telecom bill of 2000 provoked a conflict that went far beyond an issue of sectorial policy choice but amounted to a virtual plebiscite on the country's development model.
The case study also highlights the feedback effects of policy reform (even if eventually aborted) on the political actors themselves. The bi-partisan agreement on the liberalization bill had secured a more than 80 per cent majority in parliament. It would have been a success case for a 'politics of policies'-minded reform process, if only it had indeed been backed by similar public support. While initially there was some outreach to civil society groups, in the end the citizenship entered into consideration only as a factor to be kept away from the decision-making process, as both parties joined forces to accelerate the legislative passing of the bill in order to keep sufficient distance between this and the next national elections.
The successful negotiation of the party elites turned out all the more counterproductive as it increased the popular sense of an alienated 'political class' that, instead of representing society's plural positions, closed ranks on a policy measure about whose unpopularity it was all too aware. On the background of this crisis of representation it was precisely this bi-partisan agreement that became the catalyst for the disintegration of Costa Rica's half a century old two-party-system. Whereas the IDB's report on the 'politics of policies' warns of the 'tradeoff between representativeness (or inclusiveness) and policy effectiveness ' (ibid: 157) , the analysis of the Costa Rican case makes a point quite to the contrary: instead of a trade-off, we found a direct causal link between both. It was precisely the lack of representativeness that crucially undermined the policy's effectiveness.
Although the commitment to liberalization policies brought the political establishment to its most severe crisis and to the brink of electoral defeat, President Arias, in office since May 2006, is determined to continue this course. Again, this insistence will be difficult to explain in a narrowly technocratic perspective on the 'politics of policies'. While the proposal on telecommunications reform as such has been considerably moderated, in the context of the CAFTA agreement it is firmly embedded in a grand project of liberalization, with the corresponding incentives and pressures from the U.S. government and the Washington-based IFIs. As a consequence, as much for the government as for its opponents telecom liberalization becomes, once again, part and parcel of the broader dispute over the country's overall economic orientation. comodating bi-partidism is in store that had characterized the country for the past decades.
The feedback effects of liberalizing policy reforms have brought this key feature of Costa Rica's long-standing political exceptionalism to an end.
i The term 'telecommunications' encompasses the telephone system as well as other forms of data transmission such as, historically, telegraph, telex or fax, and more recently, of course, the wide array of digital network-based information technologies. ii
The United States was one of the few countries where telecom services were not provided by a public monopoly, but by a private firm, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). It operated essentially on a monopoly basis, but since the passing of the Communications Act of 1934, it did so within a sophisticated regulatory framework overseen by the governmental Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the world's first stand-alone telecommunications regulator. iii A significant share of the revenues raised through privatization, however, went into servicing the foreign debt. Argentina, which in 1989 became the second country on the continent to privatize its telecom company, presents an illustrative case: the company was sold solely for debt certificates (Schvarzer 2000: 13) . 00).
iv On the role of the network-based digital information and communication technologies in the drive for telecom liberalizations see Hoffmann 2004. v This is confirmed by the country studies in Noam (1998) . vi Author's interview in San José, April 27, 2001. vii On the crisis and economic policies of the 1980s, see Fürst (1990) , Rovira Mas (1989) , and Reuben Soto (1988) . viii For a comparative study of telecommunication reform in Rica, Guatemala and Honduras see Bull (2005) . The following section draws, aside from the explicitly given references, on numerous interviews by the author during a field stay in Costa Rica in April 2001, a systematic analysis of the country's leading newspaper, La Nación, and the press bulletins of the Legislative Assembly as well as documents of actors involved, in part found in the archives of the Fundación Acceso (San José). ix The creation of the Sala Cuarta in 1989 had been part of a judicial reform largely supported by the Inter-American Development Bank and meant to foster free market development (Wilson et al. 2004 ). However, as Wilson et al. point out, its effect on policy-making has not been quite that, and they take the Sala Cuarta's role in the liberalization of telecommunications as a case in point (ibid: 525-527). x The bill's official name is 'Ley para el mejoramiento de servicios públicos de electricidad y telecomunicaciones y de la participación del Estado'. xi Besides the three delegates of the left-wing Fuerza Democrática, this was one representative each from the Partido Acción Laborista Alajuelense, the Partido Renovación Costarricense, the Partido Integración Nacional, and the Movimiento Libertario. xii Within the governing PUSC, it was ex-President Rodrigo Carazo (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) who led a 'National Citizens' Front' (Frente Cívico Nacional) against the liberalization law and was supported by, amongst others, the social-Christian trade union Confederación de Trabajadores Rerum Novarum. xiii To save face, the government did not cancel the law altogether, but called for a 60-day freeze to open up a national dialogue. A 'Mixed Commission' (Comisión Mixta) was set up and a broad spectrum of political and social actors invited to discuss and reformulate the bill. However, this was more a conciliatory measure than an actual attempt to produce and implement a new law. xiv The following draws on one of the President's closest advisors who on the condition of anonymity recounted the political dynamics of the law's withdrawal from the executive's perspective (interview with the author, April 28, 2001 in San José). xv It is worth to underscore that the Costa Rican government lacked the option for 'restoring order' by repressive force. The use of the country's police for a large-scale repressive action against non-violent protest with broad public support would have shaken the foundations of the country's political and social system so profoundly that it was excluded. Moreover, the government was well aware of its limited practical ability to implement any such a repressive strategy. In the words of the anonymous Presidential advisor cited above: 'In any other country the government would declare a state of emergency, and if strikes would endanger the national electricity generation, the army would take over the power plants and guarantee at least a minimum of electricity supply. In Costa Rica, however, if the ICE staff refuses to produce electricity, there simply does not exist any other institution which technically would be able to operate it.' xvi Cf. La Nación, September 11, 2000: 'Desilusión y esperanza en ticos', September 12, 2000: 'Fuerte apoyo a la democracia... pero crítica a los partidos y poderes del Estado', and September 14, 2000: 'Dura crítica a partidos'. xvii For a more detailed analysis of these initiatives in expanding the digital technologies see Hoffmann (2004: 119-137 ) and Téramond (20 xviii On the corruption scandals and their political implications see Lehoucq 2005 , Salom 2005 , and Peeler 2006 
